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A SURVEY OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES

OF HERBERT HOOVER
DURING HIS PRESIDENCY

by

Adelaide B. Cambridge

Social Science 486
Eastern Illinois University
November 6 1 1961

This paper is a survey of the foreign policy of Herbert Hoover
during his presidency.

He is often associated only with domestic issues

and the Great Depression, and his foreign policies have been somewhat
unfamiliar.

The more reading that was done, the more interesting and

absorbing became his ideas and attempts to formulate his actions.

The

topic was chosen partially because of an intense interest in American
history.

There has been--and still is--a violently pro-Hoover or anti-

Hoover sentiment and criticism regarding this former president.

Another

reason for this selection is that Mr. Hoover is a contemporary.

There

may be added personal interest because he was born in a little Iowa town
near my former home.

I have attempted to present a survey of the Hoover

foreign policies as he expressed them and attempted to carry them out.
There has been considerable amount written by historians and scholars on
this subject but in the final analysis, it is based primarily on the
Hoover Memoirs and State Papers which have been extensively used and
quoted to establish authenticity and to illustrate the particular policy
under discussion.

Insofar as it is possible, each foreign policy will

be discussed individually and in the order in which it presented itself.
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The nineteen-twenties in America were bewildering and gaudy.

It

was a time of exuberance and optimistic belief that prosperity had come
to stay.

There was violence in the underworld with prohibition and

gangsterism.

There was a so-called 11 revolttt of the younger generation

in that jazz age.

Billy Sunday, Babe Ruth, and Charles A. Lindbergh were

in the headlines.

Fortunes were fantastic and illusory.

zooming and there was a runaway stock market.
and escape.

Prosperity was

It was a time of cynicism

There were a few prophets of doom but little attention was

given to the building up of forces for a depression and a holocaust in
the not too distant future.

Imperialism had not ended with the Armistice,

and power politics were on the rampage in Europe.

The world was soon

to face a great economic crisis and its destructive evils.
Against this background, on March the 4th, 1929, Herbert Clark
Hoover became the thirty-first president of the United States after having
been elected by an overwhelming electoral vote of

444

to 87 for Alfred

E. Smith. 1 The Iowa-born Republican had graduated from Stanford and had
become a widely acclaimed mining engineer, then an indefatigable director
9f relief for Belgium, Head of the United States Food Administration, a
humanitarian in postwar relief work, and a tireless Secretary of Commerce
since 1921.

Never before had this shy man been elected to a public office.

He was not an efficiency expert in the game of politics as he was in
engineering.

He had no brilliant personality nor flair for the dramatic.

He didn't smile for the photographer, and irritated some Americans because
lFoster Rhea Dulles, The United States Since 1865 (Ann Arbor,
University of Michigan Press, l9S9), p. 302.
-

J

of the stiff collars he wore.

Yet his tastes were modest and simple, and

he was a firm believer in hard work.
ist.

He was both a realist and an ideal-

To some observers he was cold and distant and yet he was reputed

to be a genial and gracious host, a sensitive man.

Fellow associates

were fervently loyal and had a sincere respect for the quiet Quaker who
believed in peace, the basic goodness of mankind, and in Americanism. 2
Through the years his friends have been full of praise and commendation;
his enemies have dwelled on his failures and ignored any accomplishments.
On a cold, rainy, March day, the inaugural address of Mr. Hoover
dealt with American hopes and ideals.

His program included a desire to

advance world peace and international progress.

As an engineer he had

travelled widely throughout the world and was familiar with many countries.

Through his relief work he was acquainted with the human misery

and devastation of war.

He strongly stood for peace but not for pacifism.

As he stated it in his inaugural address, there could be no doubt that
he wanted universal peace:
The United States fully accepts the profound truth that
our own progress, prosperity and peace are interlocked with
the progress, prosperity and peace of all humanity. The whole
world is at peace. The dangers to a continuation of this
peace today are largely the fear and suspicion which still
haunt the world. No suspicion or fear can be rightly directed
toward our country•••• We not only desire peace with the world,
but to see peace maintained throughout the world. We wish
to advance the reign of justice and reason toward the extinction
of force.

The recent treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy sets an advanced standard in our conception of the relations of nations. Its acceptance should pave
the way to greater limitation of armament, the offer of which
we sincerely extend to the world. But its full realization
also implies a greater and greater perfection in the
2navid Hinshaw, Herbert Hoover: American Quaker (New York, Farrar,
Straus, and Company, 1950) , p. 14.
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instrumentalities for pacific settlement of controversies between
nations. In the creation and use of these instrumentalities
we should support every sound method of conciliation, arbitration,
and judicial settlement. American statesmen were among the first
to propose and they have constantly urged upon the world, the
establishment of a tribunal for the settlement of controversies
of a justiciable character. The Permanent Court of International
Justice in its major purpose is thus peculiarly identified with
American ideals and with American statesmanship. • • •
Our people have determined that we should make no political
engagements such as membership in the League of Nations, which
may commit us in advance as a nation to become involved in the
settlements of controversies between other countries • • • •
It is impossible, my countrymen, to speak of peace without
profound emotion. In thousands of homes in America, in millions
of homes around the world, there are vacant chairs. It would
be a shameful confession of our unworthiness if it should develop
that we have abandoned the hope for which all these men died.
Surely civilization is old enough, surely mankind is mature
enough so that we ought in our own lifetime to find a way to
permanent peace. Abroad, to west and east, are nations whose
sons mingled their blood with the blood of our sons on the
battlefields. Most of these nations have contributed to our
race, to our culture, our knowledge, and our progress. From
one of them we derive our very language and from many of them
much of the genius of our institutions. Their desire for peace
is as deep and sincere as our own.3
After the election and before his inauguration, Mr. Hoover made his
first presidential venture in the field of foreign affairs.

In the winter

of 1928-1929, President-elect and Mrs. Hoover took a good-will trip of
about six weeks to the principal Latin American countries in order that
he might personally emphasize the American desire for their independence,
expansion, and increasing prosperity, and to exchange viewpoints with their
leaders.

During his preceding eight years as Secretary of

Comrr~rce,

Mr.

Hoover had become increasingly concerned about American policies south of
the Panama Canal.

As president, Mr. Hoover was able to establish the

principle that American citizens investing their capital in South .America
3william Starr Myers, ed., The State Papers ~Other Public Writings
of Herbert Hoover, Vol. 1, (Garden City, Doubleday, Doran and Company,
1934) pp. 8-10.
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were doing so at their own risk, "and that our interventions on their
behalf if they were unjustly treated would be purely moral representations. 11 4
There had been mili ta.ry interference in Central and South America
under preceding presidents, and the Monroe Doctrine had come to be interpreted as giving the United States the right, through military intervention,
to maintain order, which hampered any feeling of harmonious relationship
and good will.

There were bitter feelincs against the occupation of Haiti

and Nicaragua by the United States marines, an evidence of Yankee imperialism.

These troops were gradually withdrawn, the last ones early in

1933.5 Shortly after Mr. Hoover became president, a revised policy of the
Monroe Doctrine, as drawn up by Under-Secretary J. Reuben Clark, was
publicized.

This policy eliminated the concern 01· the United States with

internal affairs south of the Panama Cana1. 6
Fourteen short talks were given during the visit, all of which emphasized the ngood neighbor" theme.

Typical were Mr. Hoover's words at the

Custom House of Amapala:
I come to pay a call of friendship. In a sense I represent
on this occasion the people of the United States extending a
friendly greeting to our fellow democracies on the American
continent. I would wish to symbolize the friendly visit of
one good neighbor to another. In our daily life, good neighbors
call upon each other as the evidence of solicitude for the common
welfare and to learn of the circumstances and point of view
of each, so that there may come both understanding and respect
which are the cementing forces of' all enduring society. This
4Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Vol. 2 (New York,
The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 334.
>Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson (New Brunswick, New Jersey,
Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 58.
6samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States
(New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19S3), p. 222." -
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should be equally true amongst nations. INe have a desire to
maintain not only the cordial relations of 7governments with each
other but the relations of good neighbors.
Another result of the journey to South America was the ending of a
disagreement among Peru, Chile, and Bolivia that had lasted for years.
Officials from these countries were persuaded to list concessions that
could be made and Mr. Hoover was eventually able to suggest a compromise
that settled the issue.a
Yet another tangible development of this trip to La.tin America was
an improvement and reorganization of the diplomatic service to our southern
neighbors.

Mr. Hoover had a first-hand opportunity to witness both career

diplomats and political appointees and saw fit to remove the latter as
rapidly as possible.

This naturally resulted in a smoother and more

effective relationship.9
As an additional means of better corrununication and international goodwill, Mr. Hoover talked with officials and leaders as to the establishment
of a regular air service.

On March 15, 1930, the new service of airmail

to Central and South America was started, a direct result of the visit
south of the Panama Cana1. 10
Through exchange visits of students and teachers, Mr. Hoover felt that
both La.tin America and the United States would learn more of history,
7Herbert Hoover, Addresses Delivered During the Visit of Herbert
Hoover to Central and South America (Washington, ~C., Pan""Ainerican Union,
1929), p. 3.
8Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Vol. 2 (New York,
The Macmillan Company, 19.52), pp. 214-215.
9aay Lyman Wilbur and Arthur Mastick Hyde, The Hoover Policies
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p • .58~
lOwilliam Starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 42;:-
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customs, culture, and the aspirations of each country.

However, because

of the depression and economic unrest, nothing definite was done along
those Jines.

Throughout his administration, President Hoover continu-

ously emphasized the similarity of purpose and ideals in the Latin
American countries with those of the United States.

The fact that he

undertook a change in our relationship was due in considerable measure to
the 1913-1929 policy of intervention.11
A less tangible accomplishment of the trip was the attention and
publicity that was drawn to South America.

Newspapers, magazines, and friendly

conversations were focused on a part of the world that hadn't had such
importance given it.

Europe had been the center of attraction, but now

Americans began to realize the importance of another section of the western
hemisphere. 12
President Hoover reiterated his Latin American policy in an address
on April 13, 1929, before the Gridiron Club in Washington, D.

c.

I mention one sinister notion as to policies of the
United States upon our relationships with our Latin American
neighbors. That is, fear of an era of the mistakenly called
dollar diplomacy. The implications that have been colored
by that expression are not a part of my conception of international relations. I can say at once that it never has been
and ought not to be the policy of the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts between our
citizens and foreign States or their citi~ens. Confidence
in that attitude is the only basis upon which the economic
cooperation of our citizens can be welcomed abroad. It is
the only basis that prevents cupidity encroaching upon the
weakness of nations--but, far more than this, it is the true
expression of the moral rectitude of the United States.13
llMyers, Vol. 1, 2£• cit., pp.

543-545.

12Frank H. Simonds, Hoover, South Americanus from the Review
of Reviews, Vol. LXXIX no. 2, Feb., 1929, pp. 67-70.
13Myers, Vol. 1, ~· cit., pp. 29-30.
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Because of the depression, the flotation of foreign loans by American
banks was not of great importance under President Hoover.

One of' the

occasions when he stated his demands for certain standards and investigations of foreign loans was in a message to the Pan American Cormnercial
Conference on October 8, 1931 •
• • • such loans • • • are helpful in world development
provided always one essential principle dominated the character
of these transactions. That is, that no nation as a government
should borrow or no government lend and nations should discouraGe
their citizens from borrowing or lending unless this money is
to be devoted to productive enterprise.
Out of the wealth and the higher standards of living created
from enterprise itself must come to the borrowing country the
ability to repay the capital. Any other course of action creates
obligations impossible of repayment except by a direct subtraction from the standards of living of the borrowing country
and the impoverishment of its people.
In fact, if this principle could be adopted between the
nations of the world--that is, if nations would do away with
the lending of money for the balancing of budgets for purposes
of 111ilitary equipment or war purposes, or even that type of
public works which does not bring some direct or indirect productive return--a.great number of blessings wou.ld follow to
the entire wcrld.1.4
As was already mentioned in referring to President Hoover's inaugural
address, his hope was for the United States to cooperate with the rest of
the world in preserving peace.

Internationalists hoped for United States

participation in the World Court but there was still reaction from the
World War and the voice of isolationism was loud and strong.

Mr. Hoover

abhorred war and gave strong support to solving disputes between nations
by a court based on the administration of justice.

In his Armistice Day

address of November 11, 1929, President Hoover augmented his stand on
peace.
14Myers, Vol. 2, op. cit., p.

?.

9
• • • peace is not a static thing. To maintain peace is
as dynamic in its requirements as is the conduct of war. We
cannot say "let there be peace" and go about other business.
Nor are the methods by which peace is to be maintained and war
prevented to be established by slogans or by abstract phrases
or by academic theory. Progress toward peace can be attained
only as a result of realistic practical daily conduct amongst
nations. It can be the result only of a fra..~k recognition of
forces which may disturb peace • • • we have convenanted with
other civilized nations not only to renounce war as an instrument
of national policy but also we have agreed that we shall settle
all controversies by pacific means • • • • Our State Department
is the first of these means. It must be strengthened and supported
as the great arm of our government, dedicated to the organization
of peace • • • • We need further to extend our treaties with
other countries providing methods for reference of controversies
to conferences, to inquiry as to fact, or to arbitration, or to
judicial determination. • • • We have need to define the rules
of conduct of nations and to formulate an authoritative system
of international law. We have need under proper reservations
to support the World Court in order that we may secure judicial
determination of certain types of controversies and build up
precedents which add to the body of international law. By these
agencies we relegate a thousand frictions to orderly processes
of settlement and by deliberation in action we prevent their
development into national inflammation • • • • Men of good will
throughout the world are working earnestly and honestly to
perfect the equipment and preparedness for peace. But there
is something high above and infinitely more powerful than the
work of all ambassadors and ministers, something far more powerful than treaties and the machinery of arbitration and conciliation and judicial decision, something more vital than even our
covenants to abolish war, something more mighty than armies and
navies in defense.
That is to build the spirit of good will and friendliness,
to create respect and confidence, to stimulate esteem between
peoples--this is the far greatest guaranty of peace. In that
atmosphere, all controversies become but passing incidents of
the day. Nor does this friendliness, respect, and esteem come
to nations who behave weakly or supinely. It comes to those
who are strong but who use their strength not in arrogance
or injustice. It is through these means that we establish the
sincerity, the justice, and the dignity of a great people.
Th'3t is a new vision of diplomacy that is dawnine; in the world.1.5
The previous administration had not been successful in obtaining
ratification of United States participation in the World Court, a plan
worked out primarily by Elihu Root.

Before March

1~yers, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 126-131.

4, 1929, enough members

10
of the Senate agreed to support membership in the World Court if certain
revisions could be made.

Elihu Root, in spite of advanced age and poor

health, went to Europe to try to get the constitution of the world Court
changed so as to satisfy the dissenters in the Senate.

He was successful

and on December 10, 1930, President Hoover, feeling that public opinion
was in favor of the World Court, offered the amended protocol to the Senate.
The provisions of the protocols free us from any entanglement in the diplomacy of other nations. We cannot be summoned
before this Court, we can from time to time seek its services
by agreement with other nations. These protocols permit our
withdrawal from the Court at any time without reproach or ill-will.
The movement for the establishment of such a court originated with our country. It has been supported by Presidents
Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge; by Secretaries of State Hughes,
Kellogg, and Stimson; it springs from the earnest seeking of
our people for justice in international relations and to strengthen the foundations of peace.
Through the Kellogg-Briand Pact we have pledged ourselves
to the use of pacific means in settlement of all controversies.
Our great nation, so devoted to peace and justice, should lend
its cooperation in this effort of the nations to establish a
great agency for such pacific settlements.16
Opposition was so strong that a vote was not taken.

A year later,

President Hoover again presented the amended protocol.
In the past session of the Congress I transmitted to the
Senate protocols providing for adherence by the United States
to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Upon that
occasion I expressed my views fully not only of the wisdom of
such action, but that the safeguards against European entanglements stipulated for by the Senate had been in effect secured
and the interest of the United States protected. I need not
repeat that for over twelve years every President and every
Secretary of State has urged this action as a material contribution to the pacific settlement of controversies among nations
and a further assurance against war.17
The strength of isolationism was too strong for the matter to be
16Ibid., pp. 460-461.
17Myers, Vol. 2, ~· cit., pp. 80-81.
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successfully brought to a vote during the Hoover administration.

However,

during his years as Secretary of State from 1929-1933, Mr. Stimson was
able to sign treaties of arbitration with twenty-five countries, and treaties
of conciliation with seventeen.

Thus the United States was obligated with

nearly every country on the globe in the event that difficulties couldn't
be solved by negotiation, to refer to these processes.
On May 15, 1929, President Hoover announced his refusal to approve
the United States joining in the World Bank, or the Bank for International
Settlements as it was also called, which was created in Europe by leading
banks in twenty-six countries for the purpose of revising reparations.
The President reasoned that it might be used either to inflate or to deflate
credit.

A month later he was again urged to back a proposal for the

United States directly or indirectly joining in the formation of the World
Bank.

Again, his judgment was that .American finance might be influenced

by European actions, and he refused such support. 18
Beginning with his inaugural address, President Hoover's speeches
clearly show that his aspiration and hope in foreign affairs was focused
on peace, and he felt that the United States should take more responsibility
in world affairs.

On that rainy, windy March 4th of 1929, the world was

at peace but the old resentments and fears were still in evidence. Mr.
Hoover strongly felt that a real contribution in the establishment of
peace was the Kellogg-Briand Pact, even though there were no provisions
in it for enforcement.

This general treaty for renouncing war as an instru-

ment of national policy had been formulated during the administration of
Calvin Coolidge by the United States Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg,
and Aristide Briand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
1~rs and Newton,

~· £!!., pp. 15-16; 73; 395.

Over sixty
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nations signed the pact, each promising to use peaceful means in settling
controversies.
1929.

The Kellogg Pact had been ratified by the Senate in January,

The Pact of Peace had two parts which provided:
Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare
• • • they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of nationa~
policy in their relations with one another.
Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the
settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever
nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among
them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.19

Mr. Hoover had favored an additional section that

wou~d

make the Pact

stronger by including:
(a;) • • • in case of violation of the Pact, the other powers
should have a right to intervene by setting up an impartial
commission to investigate, conciliate, propose a settlement,
publish the facts, and withdraw diplomatic recognition from
the recalcitrant party.

(b) A declaration by the nations that they would not
recognize any territorial or other gains of any nation from
aggression and the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition in such
cases.2D
However, Secretary Kellogg had objected on the grounds that it would
be too much like action the league might undertake and that some of the
League members would be offendect. 21
How ironic that only the day before the Proclamation was to be read,
there were ominous rumblings between Russia and China.

Secretary of

State Stimson was quite upset and urged the two countries to settle their
difficulty without resorting to war.

The Japanese then stepped into the

dispute with feelings hurt that they weren't consulted.

The issue was

hurriedly settled and the Pact was read with the world apparently still
19Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1952), p. 268.
20Hoover, Vol. 2, .££• cit., p. 336.
211oc. cit.
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at peace.

That President Hoover was in whole-hearted support was evidence

on July 24, 1929, when he declared the Pact in effect:
That was a proposal to the conscience and idealism of
civilized nations. It suggested a new step in international
law, rich with meaning, pregnant with new ideas in the conduct
of world relations. It represented a platform from which there
is instant appeal to the public opinion of the world as to
specific acts and deeds • • • • I congratulate this assembly,
the states it represents, and indeed, the entire world upon the
coming into force of this additional instrument of humane endeavor
to do away with war as an instrument of national policy and
to obtain ~y pacific means alone the settlement of international
disputes. 2
President Hoover made no attempt to encourage the United States in
joining the I.Bague of Nations, but he did endorse active cooperation with
I.Bague activities of international scope, such as trade in narcotics,
expansion of marine law, and radio regulation.

The United States was

also involved in treaties that included commerce, aviation, merchant
marine, protection of intellectual property, slavery and disease.

These

treaties would help to have a more civilized world, and also brought the
realization of world responsibility to Americans. 24
Although a tariff issue is not principally in the realm of foreign
affairs but is primarily of domestic concern, yet it cannot be ignored
in surveying the issues of the world that faced Mr. Hoover shortly after
he assumed the presidency.

One of the campaign platforms of the Republican

party in 1928 was concerned with increasing agricultural tariffs and adjusting industrial tariffs.

In summation, President Hoover's policies on the

tariff fall into two ideas.

First of all, he strongly believed a tariff

should serve to protect American laborers and farmers from competition
22Loc. Cit.
23Myers, Vol. 1, ££• cit., pp. 78-79.
24Hoover, Vol. 2, ££• cit., p. 337.
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from foreigners that had lower standards of living.

Second.J.y, he advocated

a non-partisan Tariff Connnission to decide on rates which would be levied
according to the difference in costs of production in America and in a
foreign country.

He felt that the tariff should not be rigid and inflex-

ible but should adjust to changing conditions.

Above all, he maintained

that politics and the tariff should be separate.25
President Hoover endorsed the idea that there should be a balanced
economy in the United States and the way to obtain it would be by exporting
materia.ls and goods particularly suited to production at home and exchanging
them for articles accordingly suited to the economy and resources abroad.
The result would be that tariffs would offer protection primarily to the
entire economic program of the nation and secondari.ly to protecting certain
interests.

The situation was of such a serious nature that with the urging

of Senator William E. Borah, President Hoover called a special session
of Congress little more than a month after taking office.

He said:

I have ca.lled this speciai session of Congress to redeem
two pledges given in the last election--farm relief and limited
changes in the tariff • • • •
An effective tariff upon agricultural products, that will
compensate the farmer's higher costs and higher standards of living
has a dual purpose. Such a tariff not only protects the farmer
in our domestic market but it also stimulates him to diversify
his crops and to grow products that he could not otherwise produce,
and thus lessens his dependence upon exports to foreign markets.
The great expansion of production abroad under the conditions
I have mentioned renders foreign competition in our export markets
increasingly serious. It seems but natural, therefore, that
the American farmer, having been greatly handicapped in his
foreign market by such competition from the younger expanding
countries, should ask that foreign access to our domestic market
should be regulated by taking into account the differences in
our costs of production • • • •

25wilbur and Hyde,

~· ~.,

p. 181.
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In considering the tariff for other industries than
agriculture, we find that there have been economic shifts
necessitating a readjustment of some of the tariff schedules
• • • • What we need to remedy now is whatever substantial loss
of employment may have resulted from shifts since that time • • • •
No discrimination against any foreign industry is involved
in equalizing the difference in costs of production at home
and abroad and thus taking from foreign producers the advantages
they derive from paying lower wages to labor. Indeed, such
equalization is not only a measure of social justice at home,
but by the lift it gives to our standards of living we increase
the demand for those goods from abroad that we do not ourselves
produce. In a large sense we have learned that the cheapening
or the toiler decreases rather than promotes permanent prosperity
because it reduces the consuming power of the people • • • •
We also need important revision in some of the administrative
phases of the tariff. The Tarirf Commission should be reorganized • • • administrative changes in the rates of duty should
be made more automatic • • • • I believe a formula can be found
that will insure 2gpid and accurate determination 01· needed
changes in rates.
Experts in the field of economics urged Mr. Hoover not to endorse
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, as it was called, because it would seriously
reduce a market for European exports and it would eliminate the ability
of countries abroad in purchasing United

State~

exports.

Advice was

also given that it would encourage more trade barriers throughout the
27
world which in turn would increase the load on the American economy.
An opposition force arose consisting of Republican Old Guards,
Progressives, and Democrats which started a tariff revision, completely
ignoring the President's desires and listing about 21,000 different
items.

The House of Representatives passed the Smoot-Hawley bill the

foll.owing month but the Senate o.ebated over the bill for more than a
year, with the resu.Lt that it
pas~ed

on it.

wa~

June 16, 1930, berore both Houses

On.i.y a few days before President Hoover signed the

2~yers, Vol. 1, ~· cit., pp. 31-36.
27Dulles, ~· cit., p. 284.

16
tariff bill, he described it as "vicious, extortionate and obnoxious. 1128
President Hoover stood firm in insisting that the tariff bill include
flexible provisions and a bi-partisan Tariff Commission, and signed the
bill when these changes were made. 29
An unfortunate result of this legislation was that it required so

much ot the President•s time and attention that he couldn 1 t devote more
of his energy to the stress and strain of economic conditions at home.
He had not lacked for advice from all sections of the country, and there
was a tremendous amount of criticism directed at the President as a result
of his stand on the tariff question.
During the rest of President Hoover's administration, 250 industrial
items were reviewed by the Tariff Commission and the rates increased in
about

75 of them.30

S0111e critics have taken the position that the internal depression
plus the high tariffs resulted in great econ0111ic distress in foreign
countries. Economists also pointed out that countries abroad weren't
able to purchase as many American exports because of an increase in
duties. Economics throughout the entire world were becoming more interrelated so that action taken in one country effected another. Europe
was already in a depression and was not moving in the direction of
L/

internation peace and cooperation.
Retaliation as a result of the new tariff was not long in coming.
There was discrimination against American exports and the United States

2~axine Block, ed., Current Biog.rap!ly (New York, H.
Company, 1943), P• .309.

w.

Wilson

29william Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover,
(New York, CharlesScrtbner•s Sons, 1940), PP• 126-127.

1929-~

30w'ilbur and Hyde, .22•

.£!!••

p. 186.
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was accused of an economic war.

In decreasing imports, foreign countries

found it harder to make war payments to the United States, and critics
of the Hawley-Smoot bill maintained the depression abroad was made worse.
It should be remembered that even before this tariff legislation was put
into effect, imports from America had already decreased overseas because
of higher tariffs and trade barriers.

In fact, a Customs Truce Conference

had been held at Geneva in the spring of 1930 to alleviate the tariff
situation in Europe, but it was not a success.

Supporters of the Hawley-

Smoot tariff maintained that the Act had nothing to do with the payment
of war debts nor could the decline in trade be blamed on to the tariff.
After the Austrian and German banking crash in June, 1931 and the British
financial crisis of September, 1931, trade restrictions increased tremendously and the world trade picture looked darker than ever.
The tariff issue was a complicated one and played a large part in
the campaign issues of the next presidential election.

On the grassroots

level, voters formed their opinions or the tariff and its implications according to their means of livelihood and their expenditures. The depression and
its repercussions were still being acutely felt and as such were vital factors
in all economic levels. Feelings and aspirations are reflected in voting,
which may be a weakness of a democracy:

people too of ten tend to weigh

advantages to themselves individually with too little regard for the nation
as a whole. However, it would be disastrous to consider only national aspirations with total disregard for such effects on a world-wide basis.

Surely

President Hoover's contact with the people in the campaign was partially
responsible !or his failure on the tariff issue.

By contrast with Franklin

D. Roosevelt, he was cold, distant, scholarly, and lacked personal communication.
In regard to national defense and world disarmament, President
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Hoover's policy was simple and clear-cut but ini'initely complex to carry
out:

he wanted peace--and not war--for the American people, and tried

to promote disarmament in an attempt to prevent another war. Under the
Harding administration in 19211 a beginning had been made toward limiting
naval armaments, but matters between Great Britain and the United States
had caused the two countries to drift apart since then instead of there
being a workable agreement between the two countries.

In a Memorial

Day address in 1929 at Arlington National Cemetery, President Hoover
asserted that the Kellogg Pact should be upheld with a limitation of
Armaments, and submitted a plan for negotiation with other powers •
• • • to arrive at any agreement through which we can,
marching in company with our brother nations, secure reduction
of armament, we must find a rational yardstick with which to
make reasonable comparisons of their naval units with ours and
thus maintain an agreed relativity. So far the world has failed
to find such a yardstick. To say that such a measure cannot
be found is the counsel of despair, it is challenge to the
naval authorities of the world, it is the condemnation of the
world to the Sisyphean toil of competitive armaments.

a

The present Administration of the United States has undertaken to approach this vital problem with a new program. We
feel that it is useless for us to talk of the limitation of
arms if such limitations are to be set so high as virtually to
be an incitement to increase armament. The idea of limitation
of arms has served a useful purpose. It made possible conferences in which the facts about national aspirations could be
discussed frankly in an atmosphere of friendliness and conciliation. Likewise the facts of the technical problems involved,
and the relative values of varying national needs, have been
clarified by patient comparison of expert opinions.
But still the net result has been the building of more
fighting ships. Therefore we believe the time has come when
we must know whether the pact we have signed is real, whether
we are condemned to further and more extensive programs of naval
construction. Limitation upward is not now our goal, but actual
reduction of existing commitments to lowered levels.
Such a program, if it be achieved, is fraught with endless
blessings. The smaller the armed force of the world, the less
will armed force be left in the minds of men as an instrument
of national policy. The smaller the armed force of the world,
the less will be the number of men withdrawn from the creative
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and productive labors. Thus we shall relieve the toilers of
the nations of the deadening burden of unproductive expenditures,
and above all, we shall deliver them from the greatest of human
calamities--!ear. We shall breathe an air cl~!red o! poison,
of destructive thought, and of potential war.
The A:rtJry had assured President Hoover that it was strong enough to
repel foreign

invasion, and the Air Force was enlarged to about 21 800

planes, which was an increase of forty percent. 32 So it was to the problem
of naval limitation that President Hoover turned his attention since Great

Britain and Japan were seemingly engaged in naval rivalry. He wanted a
Naval Conference held which would attempt to limit all warships, but before
the Conference could actual]Jr start, agreement needed to be made by the
leading powers on certain important problems. With the President•s supervision, Secretary of State Stimson and Ambassador Charles G. Dawes personal]Jr negotiated with the Prime Minister of England, J. Ramsey MacDonald,
regarding the relative cruiser strength of the two countries. An agreement
was reached as to the equality in the fighting strength of the two navies
and there seemed to be a likelihood of also reducing naval strength. A temporary agreement was sent to Japan, France, and Ita:cy-, with rejection by the
latter two. President Hoover invited Premier MacDonald to visit this country
in October, 1929, in order that naval reduction agreements could better be
reached, as well as promoting amiable relationships. During a cordial and
friend]Jr visit in Washington and the President's camp at Rapidan, Virginia,
agreement on the major questions under consideration was made, with approval
by Japan pending.

It is of interest that this was the first visit of a prime

31.william Starr Myers, ed. 1 The State Pa;ars and Other Public Writings
or Herbert Hoover, Vol. l (Garden~tY, Doub! ay Doran and Company, 1934)
PP• 66=67.
32Hoover, Vol. 2, op. ~., P• 339.
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minister of England to the United States. Mr. MacDonald was a success with
his friendliness and personal charm.33
A joint statement was made on good-will between Britain and the United
States, a part of which is especially significant.
The part of each of our governments in the promotion of
world peace will be different, as one will never consent to
become entangled in European diplomacy and the other is resolved
to pursue a policy of active cooperation with its European
neighbours; but each of our governments will direct its thoughts
and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the
world.
Our conversations have been largely confined to the mutual
relations of the two countries in the light of the situation
created by the signing of the Peace Pact. Therefore, in a new
and reintorced sense the two governments not only declare that
war between them is unthinkable, but that distrusts and suspicions · arising from doubts and fears which may have been justified before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence national
policy. We approach old historical problems from a new angle
and in a new atmosphere. On the assumption that war between
us is banished, and that conflicts between our military or naval
forces cannot take place, these problems have changed their
meaning and character; and their soluti~ in ways satisfactory
to both countries, has become possible.

Plans were made for the Naval Conference of the five great naval
powers, United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, to meet in
London in January, 1930. Secretary of State Stimson was head of the
American delegation, which consisted of Secretary or the Navy Adams,
Ambassadors Dawes and Gibson, Senators David Reed and Joseph Robinson,
and Dwight Morrow. The Chief Naval Advisor was Admiral William

v.

Pratt.

This was certainly a strong delegation.35
Early in the Conference it was evident that technical discussions

~

33iJenry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace
(New York, Harper and Brothers, l947J; p. 166.
-
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~ers, Vol. l, .£f• ~., p. 108.
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would hopelessly involve everyone.

There seemed to be no difficulty in

arrangements with Britain and Japan; however, France was not agreeable
to reduce its small navy unless some kind of guarantee for her future
security would be given by the United States and Britain. When this wasn•t
forthcoming, France wanted a consultative pact in the event of a possible
attack. Secretary Stimson was willing to accept, but the President disagreed because the United States would be morally obligated to give military
help to France in the event of war. Reports from Europe and more internationally minded Americans insisted that the United States was destroying
the Conference, which highly irritated the President who was normally
calm and conservative. He informed the American delegation that he really
wasn't concerned whether or not France restricted her navyJ his main
interest was that Britain agree to an equality with the American navy
and to extending the 5:5:3 ratio to Britain, Japan, and American navy
vessels. It France and Italy didn't want to participate in the general
agreement, it would not be significant. By April 22, 1930, the treaty
was finished and signed by representatives from the five attending nations,
although France and Italy signed only acceptance of the minor clauses.
According to the treaty, the United States and Britain would have parity
in naval strength. The Japanese would have equality in submarines but they
agreed to a 5:5:3 ratio tor cruisers, major ships, and auxiliary ships.
Included was a clause providing that in the event a non-signatory power
threatened any or the signers in naval construction, restrictive obligations
were no longer binding. J6

FrOlll

Secretary

or

State Stimson's viewpoint, the

most important aspect of the treaty was the prohibition

or

unrestricted

~arold Wolf'e, Herbert Hoover (New York, Exposition Press, 1956),
PP• 175-177.
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submarine warf are.37
Although there was something achieved toward disarmament, results
of the Conference were disappointing. Naval rivalry among the big powers
was temporarily curbed but .American reaction was far from whole hearted
in its support.

In the first place, there was almost a billion dollars

difference between the American and British navy, and to bring the former
in line with the latter would not mean a decrease in taxation. Then there
was opposition by some who felt the naval strength of America had been
limited too much.38
The Naval Limitation Treaty was presented to the Senate by the
President on May 1, 1930, but there was such strong feeling against
ratification that it adjourned without any action. A special session
was called on July 7 to discuss the treaty and present reasons for
ratification. Presid.ent Hoover stated:
Our people believe that military strength should be held
in conformity with the sole purpose of national defense; they
earnestly desire real progress in limitation and reduction of
naval arms of the world, and their aspiration is for abolition
of competition in the building of arms as a step toward world
peace. Such a result can be obtained in no other way than by
international agreement.
The present treaty is one which holds these safeguards and
advances these ideals. Its ratification is in the interest
of the United States. It is fair to the other participating
nations. It promotes the cause of good relations.
• • • • History supports those who hold to agreement as
the path to peace.
• • • • We have only to look at the state ot Europe in
1914 to find ample evidence of the futility and danger of
competition in arms • • ••
37stimson and McBundy, .2E• cit., p. 172.
38wolfe, .2E• cit., P• 177.
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Defense is the primar,y tunction ot government, and therefore our first concern in examination of any act of this character
is the test ot its adequacy in defense. No critic has yet
asserted that with the naviea provided in this agreement,
together with our army, our aerial defense, and our national
resources, we cannot defend ourselves, and certainly we want no
militar,y establishJl'lent for the purpose ot domination of other
nations • • • •
This treaty does mark an important step in disarmament
and in world peace. It is important for many reasons that it
should be dealt with at once. The subject has been under discussion since the Geneva Conference three years ago. The lines
of this treaty have been known and under discussion since last
summer. The actual document has been before the American people
and before the Senate for nearly three months. It has been
favorably reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Every solitary tact which affects judgment upon the treaty is
known, and the document itself comprises the sole obligation
of the United States. If we fail now the world ~11 be again
plunged backward from its progress toward peace.3
There was bitter debate in the Senate.
had been made.

Some feared secret dealings

Embittered isolationists were acrimonious. Advocates of

a big navy and those connected with powerful shipping interests were
forced to realize that there was plenty of room for expansion under the
Treaty.

On

July 21 1 19301 the London Naval Treaty was ratified, but a

resolution was also passed exonerating the United States from any secret
agreements that might have been made.

President Hoover signed the treaty

the following day and released the statement:
With the ratification by the other governments the Treaty
will translate an emotion deep in the hearts of millions of
men and women into a practical fact of government and international relations. It will renew again the faith of the world
in the moral forces of good will and patient negotiations as
against the blind forces of suspicion and competitive armament.
It will secure the full defense of the United States. It will
mark a further long step toward lifting the burden of militarism
from the backs of mankind and to speed the march forward of
world peace. It will lay the foundations upon which further
constructive reduction in world arms may be accomplished in
the future. We should by this act of willingness to join with
39Myers, Vol. 1, ~· ~·• PP• 351-356 •
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others in limiting armament, have dismissed from the mind of
the world any notion that the United States entertains ideas
or aggression, imperial power or exploitation or foreign nationa.40
There surely can be no argument that President Hoover wanted to
further better relations with other countries. His intense desire for
peace was so great and he believed that naval disarmament would be a
move in that direction.

The relationship with France and Italy were some-

what strained as a result.

However the treaty was a move in the direction

of disarmament and peace.

Secretary Stimson considered it even more impor-

tant that it also improved relations with Great Britain and Japan.41
During President Hoover's administration, new war vessels weighing
80,000 tons were completed and work on 1001 000 more tons was nearly

completed. Four battleships were modernized and three more were nearing
completion.42
As far as reduction or land armies was concerned in the desire for
peace, the American army was already so small that it had no bargaining
power.

The Treaty or Versailles called for reduction of armies and the

League of Nations was supposed to accomplish this.

Nothing had been done

in this direction but the President's viewpoint was that peace was threatened
as armies grew.

On May

4,

1931, at an address before the International

Chamber of Commerce in Washington, President Hoover emphasized again the
need for disarmament.
I wish to give emphasis to ••• the limitation and reduction
of armament. The world expenditure on all arms is now nearly
five billions or dollars yearly, an increase or about 70 per
cent over that previous to the Great War. We stand today with
40r.zy-ers, Vol. 11 op. cit., PP• 359-360.
4lstimson and McBundy, op. cit., p. 174.

42Hoover, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 339.

nearly 5,500,000 men actively under arms and 20,000,000 more
in reserves. These vast forces greatly exceed those of the
pre-war period. They still are not demobilized, even though
twelve years have passed since the Armistice, because of fear
and of inability of nations to cooperate in mutual reductions.
Yet we are all signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, by which
we have renounced war as an instrument of national policy and
agreed to settle all controversies by pacific means. Surely,
with this understanding, the self-defense of nations could be
assured with proportionately far less military forces than these.
This vast armament continues not only a burden upon the economic
recuperation of the world but, of even more consequence, the
constant threats and fears which arise from it are a serious
contribution to all forms of instability, whether social,
political, or economic • • • •
We have made considerable progress in the limitation and
reduction of naval arms. We have laid the foundations for still
further progress in the future. These agreements have contributed greatly to reduce the burden of taxes and to establish
confidence ang 3good. will among the nations who have been signatory to them.
The United States was assuming a broader role in international affairs
in spite of nonmembership in the League. Much to the distress and alarm
of isolationists, the President was determined that the United States should
be a participant in discussing the reduction of armies in a conference

ot the League of Nations

in Geneva on February

2, 1932. .Ambassador to

Belgium, Hugh Gibson, was in charge of the American delegation.

Arter

several months with nothing accomplished, Mr. Gibson was advised by the
President to make a simple and direct proposal abolishing aggressive
weapons and offering a systematic order for reduction of land armament.

He advocated abolishing bombing planes, tanks, mobile guns, poison gas,
and submarines; a reduction in battleships, and a reduction in armies
by a third above essential police force.44

43ivers, Vol. 1, ~·
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44Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, The Problems of Lasting Peace (Garden
City, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1942), P• 2~.
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This important document in the endeavor ror disarmament reads in
part:
The time has come when we should cut through the brush
and adopt some broad and definite method or reducing the overwhelming burden ot armament which now lies upon the toilers of
the world. This would be the most important world step that
could be taken to expedite economic recovery • • • • We can
still remain practical in maintaining an adequate self'-defense
among all nations, we can add to the assurance of peace and
yet save the people of the world from ten to fifteen billions
of wasted dollars during the next ten years • • • • The KelloggBriand Pact, to which we are all signatories, can only mean that
the nations of the world have agreed that they will use their
arms solely for defense. This reduction should be carried out
not only by broad general cuts in armaments but by increasing
the comparative power or defense through decrease in the power
of attack • • • • The reductions must be real and positive.
They must effect economic relief • • • • I propose that the
arms of the world should be reduced by nearly one-third • • • •
In order to reduce the offensive character of all land forces
as distingi~ished from their defensive character, I propose the
adoption of ~the presentation already made at the Geneva Conference
for the abolition of all tanks, all chemical warfare and all
large mobile guns • • • • I propose • • • there should be a
reduction of one-third in strength of all land armies over and
above the so-called police component • • • • All bombing planes
to be abolished • • • the treaty number and tonnage of battleships shall be reduced one-thirdJ that the treaty tonnage of
aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers shall be reduced
by one-third, and that no nation shall retain a submarine tonnage greater than 35,000 •••• The effect of this plan would
be to effect an enormous saving in cost of new construction
and replacements of naval vessels. It would also save large
amounts in the operating expenses in all nations of land, sea,
and air forces • • • • I know of nothing that would give more
hope for humanity today than the acceptance or4guch a program
with such minor changes as might be necessary.
The proposals were enthusiastically received by most of the delegates, and even the

Army

Technical Committee of the Conference felt it

was the most constructive suggestion that had been made and voted for
its adoption.

Great Britain and France were in strong opposition, and

even though the proposals had the approval of thirty-eight nations, nothing
other than discussion was done and the meeting adjourned.

4~ers, Vol. 2, ~· ~., PP• 211-213.
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security made any decisive action impossible.

By

the time the Geneva

Conference should meet again, President Hoover had been defeated for reelection. 46
On the same day that President Hoover notified Congress of his intent to send delegates to the Geneva Conference, he urged Senate ratification of a treaty controlling trade in arms and ammunition, signed
by President Coolidge in June,

1925. In spite of promises of action,

the Senate had done nothing, with the result on January 10, 1933, a special
message was sent to Congress urging immediate action.
This convention has been adhered to by a large number
of the other important nations and is practically stopped through
failure of the United States to adhere to it. Its ratification
would contribute to the ends being sought by the entire world
for the prevention and limitation of war • • • • If ••• it
is impossible for the Senate to now ratify this treaty it is
urgent that legislation should be passed conferring upon the
President authority in his discretion to limit or forbid shipment of arms for military purposes in cases where special undertakings of cooperation can be secured with the principal arms
manufacturing nations.
While such a measure would not accomplish the whole of
the purposes which the advance thought in the world requires,
it would at least enable the Executive in special cases to place
the United States in line with other nations who are willing
to make such sacrifices in the prevention of military conflict. 47
There was little cooperation on this matter between the President
and Mr. Roosevelt, the President-elect, or with Democratic leaders in
Congress, and nothing was accomplished.
ttHumanitariantt is a word that many admirers of Herbert Hoover find
synonymous with him.

However, he is also a realist, a practical man.

One of his proposals for relieving human suffering in time of war was
the immunity of food ships.
46iroover, Vol. 2, op.
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during World War I and following the War, as Director of Relief, were
centered on getting food to the starving. An important address regarding
his belief was held on Armistice Day in 1929 at the Washington Auditorium.
I am going to have the temerity to put forward an idea
which might break through the involved legal questions and ageold interpretations or right and wrong by a practical step which
would solve a large part of the intrinsic problem • • • •

For many years, and born or a poignant personal experience,
I have held that food ships should be made free of any interference in times of war. I would ~lace all vessels laden solely

with food supplies on the same footing as hospital ships. The
time has come when we should remove starvation of women and children from the weapons of warfare.
• • • protection for overseas or imported supplies has
been one of the most impelling causes of increasing naval armaments and military alliances. Again, in countries which produce surplus food their economic stability is also to a
considerable degree dependent upon keeping open the avenues
of their trade in the export of such surplus, and this again
stimulates armament on their part to protect such outlets • • • •
In all important wars of recent years, to cut off or to
protect such supplies has formed a large element in the strategy
of all combatants. We cannot condemn any one nation; almost
all who have been engaged in war have participated in it. The
world must sooner or later recognize this as one of the underlying causes of its armed situation, but1 far beyond this, starvation should be rejected among the weapons of warfare • • • •
The protection of food movements in time of war would constitute a most important contribution to the rights of all parties,
whether neutrals or belligerents, and would greatly tend toward
lessening the pressure for naval strength. Foodstuffs comprise
about 25 per cent of the commerce of the world but would constitute a much more important por~~on of the trade likely to
be interfered with by a blockade.
This program was warmly received and vigorously approved, both in
the united States and abroad.

However, it met with great opposition in

Great Britain and France, especially the latter on the basis of the strength
of an economic blockade.

President Hoover determined the matter would

be renewed 'Whenever further opportunity presented itself.

48Myers, Vol. l, ~· ~., PP• 129-131.
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One little publicized action of the Hoover administration was taken
on September 9, 1930, to temporarily stop all immigration into the United
States in an effort to give more work to American unemployed. At that
time, there were about 250,000 immigrants per year, and most or them tried
to find work. An estimation has been made that this move prevented the
addition of several hundred thousand persons to the unemployed lists within the next three years. 49
The moratorium is a tremendous and intricate subject with more than adequate material tor a separate study. The reparations tangle and war debt
is involved and complicated, but some attention must be given to President
Hoover•s attempt to obtain a moratorium on as well as a revision of intergovernmental debts.

In the summer of 1931 1 a financial crisis in Austria

and Germany was partially the result of the French withdrawing credit from
Austrian banks because a proposed German-Austrian customs union of March

21 could be interpreted as a move toward political union. As a result, the
leading Austrian commercial bank, the Kredit Anstalt, failed.

That in turn

threatened the financial status of leading German banks and insurance companies, and a flight of capital from Germany began. Then the German budget
was unbalanced and American private credits were in a precarious situation.
Financial insecurity spread from central Europe throughout the world. Coupled
with the dangerous financial situation in Europe, the United States was
deeply involved in an economic and business upheaval of its own. The
European situation went from bad to worse and there was general concern
and apprehension. After making what allllost amounted to a telephone survey
of Congress, on June 20, 1931 1 President Hoover met the European collapse
with a moratorium on intergovernmental debts.SO
49Myers and Newton, 2.E• ~·, PP• 44-45.
50rbid., PP• 81-92.
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President Hoover's proposal to postpone during one year all payments
on intergovernmental debts was in part:
The American Government proposes the postponement during
one year o£ all payments on intergovernmental debts, reparations,
and relief debts, both principal and interest, of course not
including obligations of governments held by private parties.
Subject to confirmation by Congress, the American government
will postpone all payments upon the debts of foreign governments to the American Government payable during the fiscal year
·beginning July l next, conditional on a like postponement for
one year of all payments on intergovernmental debts owing
the important creditor powers • • • •
Wise and timely action should contribute to relieve the
pressure of these adverse forces in foreign countries and should
assist in the re-establishment of confidence, thus f~rw8rding
political peace and economic stability in the world.
Almost immediately after the announcement of the moratorium, there

was a favorable response in prices and business. France was the only
country that did not show enthusiastic response.

The French approved

"in principle" but would not include the "unconditional reparations" and
"reparations in kind" from Germany.

On instructions from the President,

Secretary Stimson requested the German government show a cooperative attitude toward France in an effort to relieve the bitterness that had
resulted from the German-Austrian customs union.5 2
By

July 6, 1931, all fifteen governments involved accepted the mor-

atorium,, and the following statement was released by the President:
I am glad to announce that the American proposal £or one
year•s postponement or all intergovernmental debts and reparations has now been accepted in principle by all of the important
creditor governments • • • •

The technical difficulties arising from many complicated
international agreements, which involve the aggregate payment
between governments of over $800 1 000 1 000 per annum, are now

51rtrers, Vol. 1, 21?.• ~., PP• 591-592.
52Myers and Newton, .22• ~., pp. 81-98.
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in the course of solution by the good will and earnest co-

operation of governmental leaders everywhere.
The American part of the plan is, of course, subject to
the approval by Congress, but I have received the individual
assurances of support from a very large majority of the members
of both Senate and House, irrespective of political affiliations.
The acceptance of this proposal has meant sacrifices by
the American people and by the former Allied Governments, who
are with all others suffering from world-wide depression and
deficits in governmental budgets. The economic load most seriously oppressing the peoples of Germany and Central Europe
will be immensely lightened.
While the plan is particularly aimed to economic relief,
yet economic relief means the swinging of men's minds from fear
to confidence, the swinging of nations from the apprehension
of disorder and governmental unemployment and agriculture.SJ
Immediately a new crisis developed because Europe completely failed
to show any cooperation and thus was threatening the United States.
Briefly, there was a large indebtedness among nations in short-term banking
bills that had been issued by banks to banks at high interest rates that
couldn't be met.

Secretary of State Stimson and Secretary of the Treasury

Mellon represented President Hoover at a conference in London to discuss
the situation.

Nothing seemed to be accomplished, so on July 17, President

Hoover cabled to his two secretaries his Standstill Agreement whereby
the banks of the countries who held the German short-term bills would
hold them for a stipulated time.

He took a firm stand that neither the

American banks nor the American government should loan any more money
to central Europe. After some objection and opposition, the Agreement
was accepted on July 23, 1931.54
Another crisis was soon at hand.

The British financial situation

was further weakened by the French withdrawal of gold, and the Bank of

5~ers, Vol. 1, .2E• cit., PP• 595-596.
si,.Vilbur and Hyde, .2E• cit., P• 411.
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England defaulted on gold payments on September 21, 1931. The problem
was intensified with reports of a mutiny in the British navy. American
credit was weakened by foreign countries withdrawing gold and exchange.
Tariffs abroad were increased. Revolutions were taking place, and there
was general world apprehension.

Panic was widespread. With the advice

and support ot Cabinet members, a broad program was set up to meet the
situation.

One of the suggestions was the visit of Premier Laval or France

to the United States, whereby it was hoped to eliminate some unpleasant
impressions caused by recent actions or the French government, and to
discuss the world economic situation. Pleasant personal relations were
immediately established after the arrival of Premier Laval and his daughter
on October 22 1 1931.

If Premier Laval had intended to reduce French war

debt payments, President Hoover soon let him know that the American settlement was based on capacity to pay.55 The discussions dealt with three
subjects:

disarmament, readjustment of German reparations, and the main-

tenance of the gold standard.

During their talks, President Hoover firmly

maintained that the American policy of war debt payments was determined
in view of the ability of each debtor to pay, and any change in such a
policy would have to meet with the approval of Congress and the American
people. As a result of their discussions, a joint statement was released
when Premier Laval and his party left for home three days later:
The traditional friendship between the United States and
France, the absence of all controversy between our two governments, a record of many events in collaboration toward peace
ot the world, embracing among its recent phases the adoption
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, render it possible and opportune
for the representatives of our governments to explore every
aspect of the many problems in which we are mutual~ interested • • • •
We canvassed the economic situation in the world, the trends
S'iioover, Vol. 2, op. ~., P• 95.

33

in international relations bearing upon it; the problems of
the forthcoming conference for limitation and reduction of
armaments; the effect of the depression on payments under intergovernmental debts; the stabilization of international exchanges
and other financial and economic subjects • • • •
It is our joint purpose that the conference for limitation
of armaments will not fail to take advantage of the great opportunity which presents itself and that it will be capable of
meeting what is in reality its true mission, that is the organization on a firm f'oundation of permanent peace • • • •
Our especial emphasis has been upon the most important
means through which the efforts of our governments could be
exerted toward restoration of economic stability and confidence.
Particularly we are convinced of the importance of monetary
stability as an essential factor in the restoration of normal
economic life in the world in which the maintenance of the gold
standard in France and the United States will serve as a major
influence •• • •

While in the short time at our disposal it has not been
possible to formulate definite programs, we find that we view
the nature of these financial and economic problems in the same
light and that this understanding on our part should serve to
pave the way for helpful action by our respective governments.56
On November 19, 1931, the Germans carried out the terms of the reparations agreements.

On December 10, 1931, President Hoover asked Congress

to adjust temporarily debt payments in view of the world depression:
As we approach the new year it is clear that a number of
the governments indebted to us will be unable to meet further
payments to us in full pending recovery in their economic life.
It is useless to blind ourselves to an obvious fact. Therefore it will be necessary in some cases to make still further
temporary adjustments • • • •
I recommend the re-creation of the World War Foreign Debt
Commission, with authority to examine such problems as may arise
in connection with these debts during the present economic
emergency, and tg report to the Congress its conclusions and

recommendations.~7

Congress did not go along with the request.

As a result, war debts

were practically repudiated by debtor countries, with the American tax

5~ers, Vol. 2, 2£• ~., PP• 19-21.
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payers having to assume the loss.
In regard to foreign possessions, President Hoover's policy was
far from an imperialistic one. He felt that the United States should
have only such areas as would be vital to American defense.
The problem of the Philippines was considerably bigger since their
independence and separation were related to their economic stability.
President Hoover was agreeable to a complete separation of the Islands
which would not bind the United States to their defense.

He sent Sec-

retary of War, Patrick H. Hurley, to the Philippines to survey their

social, economic, political, and educational conditions. After his return,
President Hoover issued the following statement on October 27, 1931:
Independence of the Philippines at some time has been directly
or indirectly promised by every President and by the Congress.
In accord with those undertakings, the problem is one of time.
In the interest of the Philippine people, the time element involves the necessity that independence must be assured of durability and the Government of the Philippines must be assured
of stability • • • the economic independence of the Philippines
must be attained before political independence can be successful.
Independence tomorrow without assured economic stability would
result in the collapse of Philippine government r~ienues and
the collapse of all economic life in the islands.'
Filipino politicians and .American sugar producers brought pressure
to bear, and in December, 1932, Congress passed a bill for independence.
President Hoover felt the economic life of the Islands would collapse
and vetoed the bill.
The Philippine people have today as great a substance
of ordered liberty and human freedom as any people in the world.
They lack the form of separate nationality which is indeed
their rightful spiritual aspiration.
• • • the period of intermediate government prior to complete independence ••• in this act is too short, too violent • • • •
A large part of the motivation for the passage of this

bill is presumed relief to certain American agricultural industries from competition by Philippine products • • • •

58Myers, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 24.
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The income of the Philippine government has never in the
past been sufficient to meet, in addition to other expenditures,
the cost of supporting even the Filipino Scouts, much less an
army or navy • • • •
In the meantime we should develop steadily through an
expansion of the organic act a larger importance to their own
officials by extension of authority to cabinet government •• • •

-

We are here dealing with one of the most precious rights
of man--national independence interpreted as separate nationality. It is the national independence of 13,000,000 human
beings. We have here a specific duty. The ideals under which
we undertook this responsibility, our own national instincts,
and our institutions which we have implanted on these islands
breathe with these desires. It is a goal not to be reached
by yielding to selfish interests, to resentments, or to abstractions, but with full recognition of our responsibilities and
all their implications and all the forces which would destroy
the boon we seek to confer and the dangers to our freedom from
entanglements which our actions may bring. Neither our successors
nor history will discharge us of responsibility for actions
which diminish the liberty we seek to confer nor for dangers
which we create for ourselves as a consequence of our acts.
This legislation puts both our people and the Philippine people
not on the road to liberty and safety, which we desire, but
on the path leag~g to new and enlarged dangers to liberty and
freedom itself.
The Philippine Independence Act was passed over President Hoover's
veto on January 17, 1933, with provision made for the United States to
give complete independence within ten years after the establishment of
a new government.
The policies and problems of the Hoover administration in dealing
with the Far East are lengthy and somewhat complicated.

To obtain the

cooperation of other nations in restraining Japan was the focal point
of the issue.

Following World War I when democracy was popular in Japan

for a short time, a few members of the peasant class achieved the rank of
officers in the armed forces.

Many of them were poorly educated, chauvinistic,

and obsessed with almost a fanatical desire toward any kind of agitation

59~., PP• 569-576.

and conspiracy.

On the night of September 18, 1931, the young officer ele-

ment with no real provocation suddenly attacked Manchuria, an action which
helped destroy the stability in eastern Asia.

The Japanese army maintained

that an explosion set by Chinese troops had occurred along the main line of
the Southern Manchuria Railroad. Manchuria had previously been under the
influence of Russia, but that country was busily occupied with collectivizing
farms and its second five-year plan and merely hoped the Japanese invasion
would move no further west. 60 Even though the sudden attack on Manchuria
was minor in comparison with the far-reaching events that soon followed,
it was indeed a complex problem at that time.

The United States had considers-

ble commercial and political interests in the Far East.

President Hoover

felt such an attack on the part of Japan was a definite violation of the
Nine-Power (Open Door) Treaty of 1921, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the
Covenant of the League of Nations. 61

Because of Secretary Stimson's sojourn

in the Philippines and his intimate knowledge of the Orient, he was a valuable
advisor to the President.

It should also be remembered the President had

spent several years in China as an engineer, which considerably helped in
his own judgment and decisions.

Both he and Secretary Stimson wanted to

influence Japan to return the captured territory on Asia's mainland and
thereby hoped to halt Japanese aggression.

A vigorous protest was made to the Japanese government by Secretary
Stimson on September 24, 1931.

The Secretary also expressed a willingness

to cooperate with the League of Nations when it applied sanctions against
a country guilty of aggression. 62
60Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy (New York,
Company, 1959), P• 351.
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In the President's message to Congress on December 10, 1931, Mr.
Hoover said:
We have been deeply concerned over the situation in Manchuria. As parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and to the Nine
Power Treaty, we have a responsibility in maintaining the integrity of China and a direct interest with other nations in
maintaining peace there.
When this controversy originated in September the League
Nations was in session and China appealed to the Council
of that body which at once undertook measures of conciliation
between China and Japan. Both China and Japan have participated
in these proceedings before the Council ever since. Under the
Kellogg-Briand Pact all of the signatories, including China
and Japan, have covenanted to seek none but pacific means in
the settlement of their disputes • • • • It seemed • • • both
wise and appropriate rather to aid and advise with the League
and thus have unity of world effort to maintain peace than to
take independent action. In all negotiations • • • the Department of State has maintained complete freedom or judgment and
action as to participation in any measures which the League
might finally be determined upon.
0£

Immediately after the outbreak of the trouble this government advised both Japan and China of its serious interest.
Subsequently it communicated its views to both goverrnnents regarding their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In
this action we were joined by other nations signatory or the
pact. This Government has consistently and repeatedly by diplomatic representations indicated its unrem5tting solicitude
that these treaty obligations be respected. 3
Late in 1931 during the Paris meeting of the Council of the League,
Ambassador Dawes tried to encourage the Council and bolster it to take jurisdiction in the Japanese issue.

It was in this manner that the United States

gave additional strength to League action during the Far East crisis.

It

is of interest that Ambassador Dawes observed strict protocol by remaining
in his headquarters at the Ritz Hotel rather than going to the meetings of
the Council at Quai d'Orsay. 64
The whole picture of the situation in the Far East is vividly portrayed
6.3t.1yers, Vol. 2, op. cit., PP• 76-77.
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in detail by Secretary Stimson in his writings. 65 In December, 1931, the
President suggested to Secretary Stimson that the doctrine of nonrecognition
be applied to Japan1 he did not endorse either military or economic sanctions against Japan.

On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent a note to

Japan informing that country of the American policy of nonrecognition to
an aggressor nation.

The British and French did not endorse this action

and the Japanese were quick to capitalize on this disagreement.

On January

28, 1932, Japan attacked Shanghai and central China in a series of isolated
and uncoordinated military actions. Resistance was greater than the Japanese
war lords had expected and before the military forces gave up, over 50,000
regular army troops were involved. 66 When the Japanese used aerial attack
(shades of things to come) on a defenseless part of the Chinese sector of
Shanghai, Western feeling was one of indignation and rage.
President ordered a strong force of

.A.~erican

Immediately the

troops and naval forces to go

to Shanghai to protect American lives. Hawaiian and Philippine bases were
strengthened and strict orders were sent that action should be limited to
protecting Americans.

There was disagreement between President Hoover and Secretary Stimson
as to effective action.

Secretary Stimson was in great favor of economic

sanctions and felt Congress would support such a plan which he believed
would not result in war. He likewise felt that even though Britain and
France would not join in such measures, the United States would produce
the desired result acting on its own.
disagreement:

President Hoover was in complete

he felt Congress would not support such a plan, he would

not recommend it, and he believed it could lead to war.

65stimson and McBundy, _2E• ~- 1 PP• 220-263.
66
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and Secretary did reach agreement in pursuing a doctrine of nonrecognition:.
all nations agree not to recognize the territory acquired by Japan as violating the Kellogg Pact.

In February, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent identical

communications to Japan and China in which it was stated that the United
States would not recognize any action in the Far East that would endanger
The note had no etfect. 67

American rights.

It was also in February that the famous letter from Secretary Stimson
to Senator William E. Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was made public.

In eloquent terms, it stated the American position

against Japanese aggression. Humanitarian interests toward the Chinese in
the American Far Eastern policy were nobly presented at the end of the
letter. 68

Japan was not to be deterred. Problems of the world-wide depres-

sion were becoming increasingly serious and public opinion channeled itself
in that direction.
On March 11, 1932, the League of Nations agreed to the policy of
nonrecognition.

Japan did stop attacking central China but whether or not

the action of the League plus that of the United States can take credit
is debatable.
Major General Frank R. McCoy was the unofficial American representative
who participated on the Izy-tton Commission, employed by the Council of the
League, to review conditions in Manchuria. After this Commission interviewed
various government leaders in the Far East, it reported that Japanese claims
of self-defense were "inadmissible."

On February 24, 1933, it made the

recommendation that Manchuria be placed under the supervision of the Chinese

67nulles, ~· cit., p. 282.
68
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government as an autonomous state.
to be meaningful.

It was too late for any recommendation

On that same day, the Japanese delegation at Geneva under

the leadership of Mr. Matsuoka, walked out of the League. 69 The Manchurian
affair had a sad ending in the annuls of diplomacy.
Throughout his administration, President Hoover maintained a policy of
nonrecognition of Communist Russia.

Toward the end of his yerm of office,

the world was flooded with counterfeit American money printed by the Soviets.
On January 31 1933, a Russian possessing counterfeit American money was
arrested by Federal authorities as soon as he arrived in this country.

The

following day another Communist was arrested in Chicago for distributing
Soviet-printed counterfeit American money.

A long prison term resulted.70

During his presidency, Mr. Hoover's policies on World War debts
were definite and precise.

He was strongly opposed to cancellation and

felt each debtor should pay insofar as it was able. Any time a change
was necessary in view of the world depression, he was in favor of an adjustment being made.

A European Conference was held at Lausanne on July 8,

1932, which was a movement toward a reduction of war debts regardless
of capacity to pay.

President Hoover was consistent in his policy that

there should be no cancellation of war debts.

Only two days after the

Presidential election, in which the Hoover Administration was com9letely
defeated, all

of

the debtor countries asked for a suspension of payment

until the debt problem could be reviewed.

Payments were due December

15,

and President Hoover announced there was not adequate time to examine the
question before that date.

President Hoover contacted President-elect

69samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New
York, Henry Holt and Company,

1946), p. 817.
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~ ~

41
Roosevelt and the two, each with his advisors, met at the White House
on November 22 to discuss this question and attempt to agree on a policy.
It was decided that both the President and President-elect would issue
a statement of war-debt principles and moratorium methods. Most of the
debtor countries met the December

15

payment with the exception of France,

who maintained Mr. Roosevelt had not clearly stated payment was necessary
before negotiation. 71
The weeks after the overwhelming defeat of President Hoover in the
election of 1932 and the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt in the following spring were of extreme difficulty, and there is far from complete
agreement on the actions and motives of the two men during that time.
There was an attempt at cooperation but there was not a smooth transferring
of authority.

Mr. Hoover had the responsibility but actually little power,

and Mr. Roosevelt had a mandate but no legal authority.

They were both

stubborn men.
In late May, 1932, Secretary Stimson had started preparations for
an International Monetary and Economic Conference which would try to adjust
inter-governmental debts, stabilize world currency, and eliminate trade
barriers. A preliminary meeting of experts had already been held and
there was much encouragement that the con£erence could make a real contribution for future progress.7 2
In his message to Congress on December 19, 1932, President Hoover
reported on the Economic and Disarmament Conferences and also discussed
the war-debt question with the conclusions:

71tiilbur and Hyde, op. cit., PP• 506-523.
72Myers and Newton, op. cit., p. 277.
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1. A number of the most serious problems have now arisen
and we are bound to recognize and deal with them.
2. It is of great importance that preparatory action should
be taken at once otherwise time will be lost while destructive
forces are continuing against our agriculture, employment and
business.

3. Adequate and proper machinery for dealing with them
must be created.

4. • • • the discussion of debts is necessarily connected
with the solution of major problems at the World Economic Conference and the Arms Conference. The ideal way would • • •
be that some of our representatives in these matters should
be selected at once who can perform both these functions of
preparing for the World Economic Conference, and should exchange
views upon the debt questions with certain nations at once and
to advise upon the course to be pursued as to others. It would
be an advantage for some of them to be associated with the Arms
Conference • • • •

5.

Discussions in respect to both debt questions and the
World Economic Conference cannot be concluded during my administration, yet the economic situation in the world necessitates
the preliminary work essential to its success • • ••
I propose, therefore, to seek the cooperation of Presidentelect Roosevelt in the organization of machinery for advancement of consideration of these problems • • • •
The situation is one of such urgency that we require national solidarity and national cooperation if we are to serve
the welfare of the American people and indeed i f we are to conquer the f orc'~ which today threaten the very foundations of
civilization.
President Hoover then contacted Mr. Roosevelt about choosing a Commission to work on the war debt question and international stabilization,
but the incoming administration did not desire to help form such a Commission nor did it apparently approve o:f the purpose for one.

The President-

elect felt that regular diplomatic channels would be better for negotiation
rather than a new commission.

This was quite disappointing to President

Hoover who felt that even though he had only two months remaining in the

73r'1yers, Vol. 2, op. ~., pp. 552-554.
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White House, some definite action should be taken to eliminate doubts
and degeneration of foreign affairs.

Another conference between the Pres-

ident and President-elect was scheduled for January 20.

By the end of

that month, Mr. Roosevelt himself handled negotiations with the British
government regarding the war debt problem between the two countries.74
In his Lincoln Day Address of 1933 in New York City, President Hoover
presented to the nation his ideas on international currency and the need
to maintain the gold standard:
• • • so long as we engage in the export and import of
goods and in financial activities abroad our price levels and
credit system, our employment, and above all our fears will
be greatly affected by foreign influences • • • • The time has
now come when nations must accept • • • the obligations to cooperate in achieving world stability so mankind may again resume the march of progress • • • the next great constructive
step in remedy of the illimitable human suffering from this
depression lies in the international field.
• • • we find some forty-four countries which have placed
restrictions upon the movement of gold and exchange or are otherwise definitely off of the gold standard • • • •
A new phase is now developing among these nations that
is the rapid degeneration into economic war which threatens
to engulf the world • • • •
Ever since the storm began in Europe the United States
has held staunchly to the gold standard • • • •
Another phenomenon of the gold situation has increased
disturbance and wrought havoc. That is the effect of waves
or fear and apprehension.

• • • the currencies or the world are fluctuating spasmedically.
• • • the solution lies in the re-establishment or confidence • • • that solution can only be found now and found
quickly through the re-establishment of gold standards among
important nations • • • •
rr the major nations will enter the road leading to the

74Myers and Newton, op. cit., PP• 275-297.
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early re-establishment of the gold standard, then and then only
can the abnormal barriers to trade, the quotas, preferences,
discriminatory agreements, and tariffs which exceed the differences in cost of production between nations be removed, uniform
trade privileges among all nations be re-established and the
threat of economic war averted.
• • • the welfare of the American people rests upon solidarity ••• in cooperation with other natio91 in strengthening the whole economic fabric of the world. ~
Throughout his administration, President Hoover determinedly opposed
any involvement in European or Asian affairs that did not concern the
United States, and he would not participate in an economic sanction against
another nation. When he left the presidency on March

4, 1933,

three con-

f erences toward easing world tensions were still underway: World Land
Disarmament, World Economic Conference, and the extension of naval limi.
76
t a t ions.
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The foreign policies and philosophy of Mr. Hoover during his presidency have been reviewed with serious effort toward neither praise nor
condemnation. There was no attempt to evaluate or to judge the policies
as successful or failures in American diplomacyJ however, i f a lasting
peace was his objective, indeed Mr. Hoover failed.

Policies surveyed

include the relationship with Latin America, the World Court, the World
Bank, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the tariff, naval limitation, reduction
in land armies, trade in arms, immigration changes, the moratorium on
intergovernmental debts, the Philippines, Japanese aggression, war debts,
and a World Economic Conf'erence. If government or confidential material
of' these particular years is not yet available for publication, then this
survey is far from complete.

It is characteristic that Mr. Hoover's policies

and philosophy of the present seem to be remarkably basic and consistent
with those he followed more than thirty years ago.
President Hoover was passionately and unsophisticatedly devoted to
peace. He made every attempt to focus his foreign policies toward that
objective.

By the same token, he believed in thorough preparedness by

the United States, but only for defensive purposes.

If fair judgment

is to be made about the wisdom of his actions, if his statesmanship is
to be deemed moral and ethical, if he was basically too consistent, the
tempo and conditions of the world in the late twenties and early thirties
must be remembered against his own background and experiences.

There

were choices and alternatives to be faced; President Hoover accumulated
and systematized the facts with able assistance, methodically studied
them, and then made the decisions himself.

He had faith in the destiny

of his country.
Last August the 10th, Mr. Hoover reached his eighty-seventh birthday.

46
On~

John Adams, the second president of the United States who became

ninety before he died, lived longer than has the thirty-first president.
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